30 necessary implication to be drawn from the language of the Act itself. Accordingly this is a proper case where the legislative declaration coincides with the implications to be drawn from the Act itself. [38] For all those reasons the argument that s 276(1) must be construed as being a provision empowering courts to impose sentences in relation only to common law crimes must be rejected. In my opinion it is a general empowering provision authorising courts to impose sentences in all cases, whether at common law or under statute, where no other provision governs the imposition of sentence. I reject the argument that the Act, in creating the offences set out in chapters 2, 3 and 4 thereof, infringed the principle of legality by not prescribing the penalties to be imposed for those offences. I also reject the contention, unsupported by authority, that a statutory offence can only be created by parliament if it includes a penalty in the enacting legislation. That may be a requirement in countries where the criminal law is codified, but that is not the position in South Africa. [39] It follows that the decisions of the magistrate and the high court were wrong and must be set aside. The order I make is as follows: 1 The appeal is upheld. 2 The order of the high court is set aside and replaced by the following order: ‘The appeal succeeds and the order of the magistrate is altered to one dismissing the objection to the charge.’