“all written laws, and all laws, rules and principles written or unwritten having the force of law, whether in force or having such force as aforesaid before, at or after the commencement of this ordinance, in any part of Kenya.” Inspite of the resistance to the liberal approach mentioned earlier above, a contrary and more progressive view was, expressed by Crabbe J.A. in his judgment in the case of Earnest Kinyanjui Vs Muiru (supra). His Lordship through a lonely voice had this to say:“The customary law is part of the laws of Kenya and under section 59 of the Evidence Act, 1963 the court is bound to take judicial notice of it, and therefore the person relying on it need not prove it, except, I think, when the custom relied upon is a peculiar one……… Before concluding this judgment, I should like to express my own views on the general observations made by my brother Duffus that in civil claims native law and custom must be proved in a magistrate’s court or in the High Court. The rule that the customary law must be proved was stated by the Privy Council in the Ghana case of Angu V. Attah……….But this rule which was applied only in the ‘British courts’ originated from the fact that most of the early judges in the British colonial territories in West Africa were Europeans, who were un acquainted with the various rules of the customary law. The courts therefore insisted on the proof of rules of customary law. The rule was not however always followed, for in deciding questions of native law and custom, the existence or content of any rule of customary law was in some cases determined by reference to any book or manuscript recognized as a legal authority, and the court could also call to its assistance chiefs or other persons whom the court considered to have special knowledge of native law and custom. The rule in itself is fast becoming out of date, and I think it is too late to extend its application to East Africa. It may be a convenient rule in the present circumstances in Kenya, but I do not think that sections 59 and 60 (1) (a) and (2) justify a rigid adherence to the rule in Angu V. Attah………I am satisfied that if it was the intention of the Kenya Parliament that the customary law should be proved several times before the courts could take judicial notice of it, it would have said so in plain language. In my view the fact that Parliament has made provisions, such as the summoning of assessors and resorting to appropriate books or documents of reference for the purpose of ascertaining the customary law militates against the inference that the customary law must necessarily be proved.” 37