“when it is alleged that by any particular African customary law a result follows different from that which would follow under the ordinary law of Kenya, then the existence of the African customary law has, unless it has become of such general notoriety that judicial notice may be taken of it under section 60 of the Evidence Act, 1963, to be proved by the person invoking it in precisely the same way that a person invoking customary rights has to prove the custom.” The above judicial pronouncements were made after Kenya had passed an amendment to its Evidence Act in 1963 to accommodate African Customary Law as law that can be taken judicial notice of in Kenya courts. The Liberal Approach. I now turn to the liberal approach to the proof of African Customary Law. In Pande s/o Nawuku Vs R [1951] 18 EACA 263, the Court of Appeal left the question of the function of the assessors to give an opinion on Customary Law open. It, noted that the Privy Council had:“contemplated without dismay the possibility of a court being guided by the opinion of native assessors in matters of native custom.” In some parts of Africa, for instance in Buganda, then a province of the Uganda Protectorate, the colonial state allowed some flexibility in this area to the native courts. There are judicial pronouncements to show that even some European judges showed some respect to the fact that some native judicial officers possessed sufficient and useful knowledge which they could positively use in adjudicating matters involving fellow Africans under Customary Law administered by native courts and could take judicial notice of such law. In Kigozi Vs Njuki 1943 6 ULR 113Whitley C.J stated thus:“in British courts questions of custom rarely arise and when they do arise the courts probably have no definite knowledge as to what the custom is and unless the custom has become notorious it must be formally proved by evidence. In the native courts of Buganda the position is quite different. They have few written laws and no case law and consequently they are for the most part administering customary law. Justice is administered by the high Officials and Chiefs who are themselves familiar with the customs of their people and generally speaking require no evidence to inform them what those customs are. In the great majority of cases in their courts turning upon customs, it would be unreasonable to expect evidence as to custom. In a few cases where there might be a doubt as to what the custom actually is, it might be desirable or even necessary, that 35